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In this paper similarities and differences are demonstrated between Chinese and Hungarian party-
state systems. We define the structural background of different reforms that created the 
Hungarian “Goulash communism” and the reforms in “Chinese style”. We shall demonstrate how 
these structural backgrounds have lead to political transformation first in Hungary accompanied 






System transformation in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union started with the political de-
legitimating of the communist party. Political transformation logically drew the attention of 
scholars studying these regions to democratization, economic crisis and systemic outcomes
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 Regarding China, where system transformation started in the economy, China experts focused on 
economic transformation and micro- and macroeconomic growth.
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 Communication across the 
two groups was scarce owing to deviating comparative interests. Comparative interest of the first 
group has been drawn on democratization in other transforming authoritarian systems as in Latin 
America or Southern Europe
3
 logically neglecting the comparison of such stabilized authoritarian 
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 communist regimes as China. Comparative interest of the second group focused on economic 
reforms, market and the ideal sequence of system change starting with economic transformation 
rather than political, attracting macroeconomic growth rather than economic crisis. Economic 
reforms in China and post-communist countries were compared, either as lessons from Chinese 
reforms to be learned, or explaining the Chinese success compared to the less successful 
European counterparts.
4
 Communication gap between the two comparative groups left several 
issues pending. For example: the difference between system transformation and the 
transformation of any of its sub-fields (be it political or economic), the reason of different 
sequences of transformation (political or economic first), the different economic and political 
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 conditions in case of different sequences of transformation or, reasons of transformations 
accompanied by economic growth or crisis.
5
  
Hungarian reforms that started in the late 1960s providing relatively high living standards were 
outstanding among party-states. No wonder Hungarian economic system was nick-named as 
„Goulash communism”6. „Goulash communism” however, ended up in system collapse in 1989 
and transformation was accompanied by economic crisis, as in all Eastern European and Soviet 
party-states. Chinese reforms started in late 1970s demonstrating an uncontestable economic 
development. The system survived the Tiannanmen square tragedy that paralleled the domino 
system collapses all over Eastern Europe. Instead, economic development even accelerated some 
years after the political shock. Reforms in China that caused that exuberant development were 
viewed as strictly connected to wisely pursued Chinese economic policy, thus nick-named 
worldwide as “Chinese style reforms” that does not seem to follow the same tendency as its 
European counterparts.  
Was there anything in common at all between the Hungarian and the Chinese reforms?  If 
yes, what are the causes of such a different fate? Tracing back in time to find the motivations of 
reform and their structural background we arrive to one very important common factor: in the 
1950s in both countries a Stalinist centralized system was operating and both countries suffered 
transitory system collapse that pre-empted reforms. The character and motivation of these system 
collapses however was qualitatively different. In Hungary, it was a sudden, abrupt event in 1956, 
due to the destabilization of the system and the weakening of the Hungarian Muscovite 
leadership in the aftermath of Stalin’s death in 1953.7 The collapse, marked by the 1956 
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 revolution, was short-lived due to its clamp down by Soviet military intervention and fast system 
restoration with their active assistance. In China a series of transitory shocks destabilized the 
power structure. This was due to Mao’s internal power struggles that ended up in two major 
nation-wide mobilizing and decentralizing campaigns: the Great Leap Foreward and the Cultural 
Revolution. The radical campaigns temporary demolished the structure and paralyzed the 
operation of the system to stabilize Mao’s personal power against potential competitors.8 
Differences were found also in the motivations of the restoration and stabilization of the system 
in a modified power structure. In Hungary, restoration of the structure by the new leadership was 
based on the bitter political experiences of an over-centralized power concluding in revolution. 
Consequently, there was a strong drive to balance power and prevent another de-stabilization. 
This motivation ended up in decreasing personal decision-making power by increasing the role of 
collective decisions and in integrating strategic economic interests in the centralized decision-
making process for the sake of closer supervision. In China, motivation of the leader was to 
decentralize the power-structure toward provinces, integrating them in the decision-making 
process in order to eliminate the power of potential central competitors to his personal power. 
During these periods decisions over resource extraction and distribution were decentralized 
through the partial decentralization of discretion over state owned enterprises under the 
supervision of local governments. In Hungary discretion of control over economic units remained 
centralized and so did the resource extraction and distribution.
9
 The two different reasons of 
transitory collapses and divergent strategies in restorations resulted in the institutionalization of 
two different patterns of power distribution. 
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 Different patterns of power distribution, however, had several common traits: both 
differed from the centralized Stalinist structure of the 1950s; both involuntary integrated strong 
resisting (bargaining) capacities to central interventions and resource attracting capacities in the 
decision-making process through local governments in China and large enterprises in Hungary. 
Despite pattern differences both structures were characterized by the self-similar elements, 
connecting and operating principles of the communist system. Variations occurred within these 
general characteristics. 
In the next chapters, through the short introduction of the Interactive Party-State model 
(IPS),
10
 we shall first detail those general system characteristics of party-states which put them on 
common analytical grounds, and second, the structural basis of different patterns of power 
distribution that explain their differences in operation and transformation. We will show that 
these different patterns will attract different kind of instruments of resource extraction and 
distribution in order to reproduce the system. Next, we shall demonstrate that these different 
instruments will incite different ways of operation that will end up in different ways of 
transformation. Conclusions will follow that dissimilarities of reforms and transformations are 
not strategic choices but have a structural basis within which strategic choices have the room for 
maneuver and interact with the structure. Based on the model we shall respond to the puzzle why 
did Chinese reforms deviate in early 1990s from the enthusiastically learned Hungarian reforms 
of the mid 1980s? We shall reveal how did this influence the differences in their transformation 
process and conclude that this was not a question of choice. 
 
1. Self-similarities of party-states 
The model defines three overlapping and intertwined layers of relationship among 
decision-makers that form the party-state structure:  
(1) First of all, there are two special hierarchies: the party hierarchy monopolizing the 
political sub-sphere and the state hierarchy monopolizing the economic sub-sphere that allows for 
the monopolized extraction and distribution of resources (see Fig. 1)  
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Figure 1. First layer: the formal hierarchies of the party-state structure and varieties of 
interest promotion 
 
(2) The two separate hierarchies are interlinked by the party’s instruments of power that 
permeate the boundaries of non-party institutions and overlap the decision-making process 
through positional structure, activity structure, and organizational structure and through 
individual decision-makers upon their party discipline
11
. These interlinking lines develop 
dependency but at the same time serve for interest promotion of those embraced by them, 
introducing an inequality of interest promotion among decision-makers attached to and deprived 
of these lines (see Fig. 2). The multitude of threads is directly linking individuals of party and 
non-party institutions thereby causing mutual sensitivity to each others’ decisions. These 
channels (threads) of dependency and interest promotion are hidden and closed, rendering the 
institutional atomization of individual actors and enhancing their drive for individual interest 
promotion. 
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Figure2. Second layer: the interlinking threads and varieties of interest promotion 
 
(3) The decision-making process for some actors may be short-cut both within each 
hierarchy and also across state-to- party hierarchy by having the chance to directly or indirectly 
participate on higher level decision-making. Short-cuts form a structural feedback loop through 
either intra-hierarchy or cross-hierarchy dependency lines. Through feed-backs a new structural 
inequality of interest promotion is introduced for those privileged by them, since actors at one 
level may meet decision-makers of higher levels whom otherwise would never meet, thus, have 
access to otherwise hidden information, are able to influence decisions, resist interventions, 
accumulate new short-cuts and prepare to unavoidable impacts (see Fig. 3).  
 
  
Figure3. Third layer: the shortcuts (feedbacks) and varieties of interest promotion 
 
The two hierarchies with monopolized political sub-sphere, and monopolized economic 
sub-sphere, the interlinking lines and the feedbacks are the main elements of the party-state 
structure. These elements appear in three intertwined layers that will form the party-state 
network. The structure reveals its principles of connection: interlinking lines may origin only 
from party hierarchy, since they are instruments of party power? cross-hierarchy feedbacks may 
origin only from non-party hierarchy, since the loop is closed by the interlinking lines that origin 
in the party hierarchy. Structural characteristics explain the principles of operation: since all 
actors hold hierarchical dependency lines but only actors in the party hierarchy hold dependency 
lines interlinking decision-makers in all other sub-spheres, dependencies, interest promotion and 
resource extraction and allocation are directly or indirectly politically monopolized. 
Consequently, the party -- originally as one entity in one sub-sphere (political), through its 
power instruments monopolizing the political sub-field and permeating and monopolizing the 
other subfields and defining its internal inequalities -- develops into a politically monopolized 
power network that operates as a social system (Fig. 4). In this system dependencies are 
multithreaded, so is interest promotion. Structural inequalities of the capacities for interest 
promotion arise through multithreaded hidden channels and their short-cuts within and across 
party- and non-party hierarchies. Thus, bargaining capacities within the structure and formal 
 positions do not overlap. Different bargaining positions of actors will secure the distribution of 
power within the structure. 
 
Figure4. The complex network of party-states as a social system and varieties of 
interest promotion 
 
Structural and operational characteristics will provide the dynamics of self-reproduction. 
Within this complex social structure actors are in dual position: they are simultaneously holders 
of and captured by dependency lines, thereby incorporating two functions simultaneously: 
distributors and pleaders in one single entity. The dual functions will be fuelled by dual structural 
motivations:  
 As monopolistic holders of the lines, they are able to intervene the decision-
making process, and simultaneously forced to intervene since there are no 
 alternatives to intervention and thus, restraining from intervention, they would 
lose positions to other actors who will intervene 
  As embraced by these lines they are exposed and simultaneously interested in 
keeping and multiplying monopolistic dependency threads for interest promotion 
and accommodate to expectations of those who intervene. Without alternative 
ways of interest promotion, non-applying actors will lose bargaining position and 
chances for interest promotion to those who apply 
Consequently, capacity and force, exposure and interest together ensure the politically 
rational motivations of behavior for actors to reproduce bargaining status-quo and thereby the 
cohesion and reproduction of the whole network.  
Owing to actors’ dual position and function, the capacity for self-reproduction is complex: 
one single actor as holder of the lines (intervener) has resource extracting and redistributing 
capacity, while as embraced by those (pleader), it has resource attracting capacities and resisting 
capacities to interventions. These factors together will provide the constraints of the capacity for 
self-reproduction of an actor’s bargaining position.  
However, constraints of this capacity are not uniform to all actors, since positional 
differences due to built-in inequalities – interlinking lines (D2, I2) and feedbacks (I3) – will forge 
selective chances (capacities) for resource attraction, extraction, allocation and for resisting 
interventions. Consequently, this will lead to selectively soft or hard constraints of self-
reproduction according to the actors’ structural bargaining capacities. 
Major characteristic in the structure and dynamics of this social system is the outstanding 
role of political concerns. Structurally, political concerns determine the rationale of connecting 
subfields, the instruments for connection, the in-built inequalities, the principles of connection 
and operation. Structural characteristics will define the political rationality of the dynamics of 
self-reproduction of the structure through the dependencies, interest promotion and resource 
distribution, the criteria of selection, and based on that, the fixed paths of resource distribution. 
Such criteria will determine the development of selectively soft/hard reproduction constraints, the 
politically rational economic motivation and behavior (accumulating feedbacks and drive for 
growth) through hidden channels.  
 Structural and dynamic characteristics, however, will also bring about the traps of self-
reproduction. Traps will evolve due to the fact that economic efficiency constraints and 
motivations for efficiency in self-reproduction will be lacking individually and for the whole 
structure. Instead, structural constraints – that is, the given distribution of power (attracting and 
resisting, extracting and allocating capacities) – will determine the hardness or softness of 
reproduction constraints, both for individuals, for units and for the net as a whole. Thus, since 
economic behavior is politically rational instead of economically, and power distribution rather 
than efficiency determines the constraints of self-reproduction, the process of self-reproduction is 
simultaneously a process of self-consumption. 
The above features are self-similar in time, in space and in different aggregation levels 
and induce self-similar behavior and interest for selection, allocation. Characteristics of self-
reproduction are leading to self-similar traps of self-reproduction of the system. These self-
similar characteristics form the common ground for comparison of the Chinese and Hungarian 
party-states despite so many individual specifics connected to size, historical, cultural, economic, 
geographical, geopolitical differences etc. 
 
2. Structural background of the different operation of party-states  
Despite of self-similarities, party-states operate, reproduce themselves and transform differently.  
The IPS model offers a structural explanation of those differences. The structural background of 
differences is produced by the combination of the variations of constructing elements described 
above while keeping principles of operation unharmed. That is, (1) the strictness of decisions 
within the hierarchies, (2) the level of centralization or decentralization of discretions over 
extraction and distribution of resources along the state hierarchy, (3) the level of centralization or 
decentralization of the discretion of holding  interlinking dependency lines along the party 
hierarchy, its density, its outreach and its depth in the place of outreach,  and finally, (4) the  
origin, the target, the density and the accumulation of feedbacks within the network, be they 
within and/or across state-party hierarchy.  
The combination of these varieties will provide the different distributions of power within 
the network. These wide- ranging power distributions may be grouped into three characteristic 
 patterns. Pattern specifics are defined by the above factors (discretion over resource extraction 
and distribution, interlinking lines and feedbacks). These three – self-exploiting, self-
disintegrating and self-withdrawing -- patterns will have characteristic distributions of power that 
define resisting and resource attracting capacities within the structure, characteristic instruments 
for reproducing the power structure, and finally, characteristic ways of transformation. Let us see 
the three patterns in detail. 
 
  
Table 1. Main patterns of power distribution 
  
 (i) The self-exploiting pattern: this pattern was characteristic to all party-states until mid-
late 1950s and to several European and Central Asian republics till the end of 1980s and 
presently to North Korea. In this pattern, the distribution of power is such that both the extraction 
and allocation of resources and the interlinking lines are centralized, and there are weak or none 
economic feedbacks. These latter will mean weak resisting and attracting capacity within the 
network. In this case, the center has unconstrained extracting capacity, in other words, its 
reproduction constraints are soft. Softness evolves and persists due to the fact that forced 
resource redeployment (extraction and reallocation) may be repeated without meaningful 
resistance.  However, owing to unlimited extraction tensions within the structure increase to such 
extent that in case of a window of opportunity (be it external or internal) the system may collapse 
abruptly. 
 (ii) The second pattern will be called self-disintegrating which is characteristic to the 
Hungarian pattern of power distribution after 1956 temporary system collapse: here the 
distribution of power is such that interlinking threads are overwhelmingly centralized, and so are 
extraction and distribution of resources, but there are strong economic feedbacks within the net 
developed after the 1956 experience to control and integrate strategic economic entities. This 
means that attracting and resisting capacity of fed back units is high within the net in the context 
of centralized extraction and allocation. In this case however, both strong attracting and resisting 
capacity hinders the self-reproduction of the structure through measures of forced resource 
redeployment: these measures, if implemented, prove to be selective according to the extent of 
resisting capacities. In other words, forced resource redeployment efforts become form-fitted to 
specifics of power relations. In this pattern the self-similarity of motivations and behavior will 
lead to drive for growth, hoarding resources and feedbacks. However, owing to the drives and 
selective capacities of resource attraction and the politically rational selective distribution and the 
lack of efficiency constraints during reproduction of the individual position and the structure as a 
whole, the system will more frequently run into hardening reproduction constraints. 
 The higher is the frequency for running into hardening reproduction constraints and the 
longer the lack of cohesion within the net, the stronger the drive to find other ways to reveal 
resources to restore the reproduction process and status quo. When and where forced resource 
 redeployment does not work, reforms become instruments to acquire resources and to recreate the 
structure's cohesion. Let us call resource-mobilizing reforms those direct or indirect resource-
revealing actions that remain within the confines of the net. These actions restructure the context 
of activity of resource targets within the net rather than allowing the free flow of production 
factors. Restructuring may occur by decreasing the state's administrative role through the 
implementation of normative incentives for resource mobilization and measures of extraction. 
Changes may be achieved by decentralizing state and party decisions to lower administrative 
levels and/or enterprises. They may also occur by "disentangling" formerly possessed interest-
promoting channels, or narrowing the circle of those privileged. With these instruments, 
resources formerly hidden may come to surface or units formerly passive become active.    
 However, owing to the strong attracting and resisting capacity of those fed back and 
politically selective criteria of those who distribute within the net, mobilized resources will be 
allocated invariably on the basis of politically rational criteria contributing to the maintenance of 
fixed paths and the further strengthening and soft reproduction constraints of selective targets. This 
trap leads to repeated decentralization effort to reveal further resources. The continuous drive for 
revealing and exploiting further resources to distribute may be accelerated further by the hardening 
of reproduction constraints from above or from outside the net. Escalation however will occur 
parallel to the decline in the capacity to extract, centralize and redistribute resources, without the 
capacity to abandon forced paths of soft reproduction constrains of those privileged
12
.  
The recurring drives for sustaining self-reproduction will gradually disintegrate the net
13
. 
However, reform escalation will disintegrate the net without creating alternative resources and 
alternative rationality of behavior, while increasing the frequency of the hardening of reproduction 
constraints. When reproduction constraints become persistently hard since no further resources may 
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 be attracted or extracted in the given structure, decentralization of interlinking threads accelerate, 
extracting discretion is partially decentralized and drives to get rid of burdens increase while efforts 
to create resources outside the net or attract from above strengthen. Parallel to reform escalation 
through decentralization and declining cohesion within the network the party’s legitimacy strongly 
declines. The condition of the structure deteriorates to such extent that cohesion of the structure may 
not be regenerated, and a gradual political transformation takes place.  
(iii) The third type of pattern will be called self-withdrawing which refers also to the 
Chinese pattern of power distribution. In this pattern interlinking threads are partially 
decentralized, so are resource extraction and allocation capacities owing to Mao’s former 
campaigns,
14
 while there are strong economic feedbacks from several dimensions of the network. 
Therefore, there is an increased resisting capacity to resource extraction and alternative to central 
resource distribution within the given pattern at lower levels of administration. Under these 
circumstances neither forced resource-redeployment nor resource-mobilizing efforts are 
sufficient for self-reproduction of the whole structure. Meanwhile, due to decentralized resource 
extraction and the selectively soft allocation overheating is taking place also at local levels and, 
reproduction constraints of the whole structure become frequently hard.  Consequently, resource 
acquisition drives within the net will be soon forced to either get rid of allocation burdens by 
continuously decentralizing responsibilities (expenses and targets of allocation), and/or leap out 
of the net for further resources by allowing the increase of the field outside of the net for further 
resource extraction. This is the structural reason why despite implementing the Hungarian type 
decentralizing reforms within the network deviation from those was structurally unavoidable in 
China for the sake of creating resources for the reproduction of the whole structure.   
Let us call resource-creating reforms those measures through which decision-makers 
partially or completely "leap" out of the net or let the field outside the net grow in order to 
acquire new resources
15
. This process increases the alternative field to the net (alternative behavior, 
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specific pattern was institutionalized and stabilized. 
15
 For example, extractable resources are created by allowing increases in the number of 
resourceful units outside the net and the creation of the institutional conditions for this process. 
 activity, organization, property resources and rationality). By that token, these reforms induce the 
relative retreat of the net
16
. 
However, resource-creating reforms will make the net retreat in absolute terms too. This 
process may occur either directly, by deliberately withdrawing interlinking- and hierarchical lines 
(for example, the withdrawal of the net from below county level through semi-free governor 
elections on township level in China
17
). Another reason for the absolute retreat of the net is the 
attractiveness of the alternative options of resource acquisition outside the net. Options will motivate 
decision-makers to partially or definitely exit
18
 the network, vacate the rigid structures and to leave 
burdens within the net.
19
 The net may retreat also by being cut off. This move occur when the units 
to which the network is attached disappear through bankruptcy and close-down or privatization of 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
For example, letting the exchange of over-the plan products on market prices, to increase 
revenues outside the net, to enhance conditions for domestic and foreign private ventures, 
enhance private plot cultivation, to abolish collectives and cooperatives, setting up domestic 
private enterprises, encouraging the settlement of foreign funded enterprises. Allowing the 
"entrance" of resources from outside the net, by attracting FDI for creating joint-ventures, 
transforming SOEs into shareholding enterprises for foreign and domestic private capital 
infiltration, gradually lifting up barriers to labor mobility, price setting and product and capital 
flow  etc. 
 
16
 Naughton calls the relative growth of non-state sector as "growing out of the plan" in 
McMillan and Naughton, 1992, pp.130-143 
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 Lai, Hairong. “Development of Competitive Elections since mid 1990s on Township Level in 
Sichuan Province in China.” China Perspectives (Hong Kong), Vol. 51,  2004.  pp. 13-27. 
January-February; Shuhfan Ding. “The Party-state Relationship in China, 1978-1986.” 
Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame, in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of PhD, Dept. of Gov. and International 
Studies, UND. June 1987, p.32, fn. 18 
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 This may occur either individually (Roger H. Gordon and David D. Li, 1997, p.1-2 and 23), or as 
organization (Qian, Yingyi. “Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control.” 
Economics of Transition, 4 (2). 1996. pp. 427-47, p. 430;  Smyth, Russel. “Recent Developments 
in Rural Enterprise Reform in China: Achievements, Problems and Prospects.”  Asian Survey. 
Vol 38. N. 8. 1998. pp.784-800, p. 798.  
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 E.g. in the form of daughter enterprises which than found joint ventures with private ones). Qian, 




 and TVEs. It may retreat also through the abolishment of organizations and functions of 
resource distribution, or when the state itself withdraws completely, or partially (e.g. from 
different sectors). The network may also weaken by attracting resources from outside the net (such 
as FDI
21
), integrating alternative interests, alternative behavior and capital that will decrease the 
political influence
22
 Privatization, alternative resource attraction, and joining the field outside the net 
will result in either automatic or forceful retreat of the net in absolute terms. These actions have 
several consequences: they decrease the number of sub-units attached to the net and in exchange, 
also may provide the unit with resourceful entities outside the net, increase the amount of 
redistributable resources to the remaining sub-units within the net.  
Moreover, because of available alternative resources, the intensity of using the net also 
decreases. The higher is the expectations for harder reproduction constraints within the net the more 
intensive the pressure to decentralize and to leap out of the net. This drive will cause the escalation 
of resource creating reforms. Because of the escalation of the implementation of the above measures, 
the main building blocks of the system (interlinking threads are withdrawn, break, left in limbo or 
empty, state property is sold out or closed down, state bureaucracy retreats etc) gradually retreat 
from the economic subfield, while outside of it the economic subfield of a new system emerges. 
Through this parallel but opposite processes the system transformation takes place with economic 
transformation first accompanied by macroeconomic growth overwhelmingly provided by the field 
outside the network.  
Deviations in the sequence and process of transformation in Hungary and China 
Concluding the above process, in the case of Hungary, political transformation comes first. The 
retreat of the net and the emergence of the new political sub-sphere is gradual. In this pattern, 
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 According to the utilization of resources earned from privatization, resources may be re-
deployed if used for the subsidization of remaining SOEs, or social causes, and may end in 
resource creation if invested in joint ventures or infrastructure or shares in private enterprises. 
Meanwhile, privatization decreases subjects for resource extraction within the net. 
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 political transformation is followed by economic transformation. Thus, economic transformation 
occurs under democratic political regime. Sequence also determines economic conditions during 
political transformation: There is a steady economic decline, indebtedness, and growth of the 
volume of loss-making enterprises and restriction spiral that de-legitimates the communist party 
despite accelerating decentralizing reforms and makes it retreat gradually from political sub-
sphere. Horizontal organizations and new parties form under conditions of macro economic 
imbalances.  
In case of political transformation hardening structural constraints will drive economic 
policy and party to get rid of burdens by decentralizing the discretion over interlinking lines that 
reach the economic decision-makers. The party itself weakens its influence within economic units 
by abolishing full-time position of party secretaries and subordinating them to enterprise 
managers by nominating them part-time. Declining influence and legitimacy of the party 
enhances the emptying of the structure: growing number of party members quit the party due to 
disillusions, declining privileges and alternative options; also staff members are quitting party 
positions to public or private spheres; not only actors leave but also the interactivity through 
network gradually vanishes due to the declining capacity of resource distribution. There is a clear 
withdrawal of vertical and interlinking lines due to the introduction of multi-candidate elections 
in several fields: at local governments, in the nomination of enterprise managers, to the 
parliament and to the central committee membership. There is a clear decentralization and later 
cut off of interlinking lines to economy and state bureaucracy when party decides first to 
decentralize, later to abolish the nomenklatura system first in unimportant positions than 
abolishing it totally. Cut offs occur also due to starting close-downs and privatizations: the 
party’s hierarchical line connected to party secretaries in enterprises are cut off and disappear and 
cut off interlinking lines to enterprises remain in limbo. Streamlining occurs in the name of 
rationalization drives: inter-ministerial and intra-party committees, or abolishment of such 
committees, thereby decreasing the pressure towards distribution, disaggregation of large 
enterprises to increase competitiveness by abolishing their feedbacks and pressure to 
redistribution. Party members form horizontal platforms within the party, expressing different 
political -- conservative, liberal, reformist – views, exposing sharpening power struggle, reform 
groups are organized horizontally within the network crossing vertical lines of the hierarchy and 
interlinking lines among hierarchies between party and non-party institutions. Party declares the 
 withdrawal from the overall principle of party hegemony. Interlinking lines are abolished, paid 
positions of party secretaries within non-party institutions are abolished and party functions 
remain social work without influence. Party apparatus is abolished, cadres scattered. Upon 
political pressure from outside the net Party organizations within non-party institutions were 
forbidden and party members became „outsourced” from non-party institutions to territorial 
organizations. Worker’s militia, the party’s own military organization was abolished. As a result 
of the process of retreat, Party as a social system was withdrawn from political and economic 
subfields, abolished as a hegemonic party and reborn as a political entity in a de-monopolized 
political sub-field. 
Parallel to the gradual retreat, a new political sub-field is emerging outside the net. 
Growing number of horizontal groups outside the net is allowed to form: first NGOs of various 
kinds emerge with non-political scope. Formation of various interest groups was allowed to 
organize both on economic, public and political subfields. Formation of various political parties 
was allowed and multiparty system institutionalized. Former party members leaving the net join 
new formations. Crucial laws were accepted by the old parliament under the pressure of new 
political organizations and reform-groups. Crucial laws that need two-thirds of votes for change 
allows the institutionalization of a democratic political regime through free elections, publicity 
law, rule of law, strike law 
Regarding the Chinese case, economic transformation comes first, either followed or not 
by political transformation. The retreat of the net and the emergence of the new economic sub-
sphere is gradual, economic transformation occurs under authoritarian political regime, 
accompanied by macroeconomic growth (essentially due to the economic field outside the net) 
and selective tensions among actors located within the net and among those within and outside 
the network. Political transformation is questionable, since economic growth provides legitimacy 
to the party that delays political transformation, while uncompensated economic and social 
tensions and following economic decline could potentially induce such process.  
These factors will characterize the transformation since they may strengthen in different 
sequences, alone, simultaneously, or in different combinations. Due to frequently hardening 
reproduction constraints of the network decisions over allocation, price, investment, extractions 
are decentralized while revenues and revenue sources are siphoned away. The network empties 
 when competitive capacities (manpower, organizations and capital) are transferred outside the 
net, in other words, state values are stripped off the net. The network may weaken, due to the 
infiltration of alternative capital, alternative interests and behavior from outside the net that 
decreases the influence of the state and the party through the hierarchical and interlinking 
dependency lines. The network may be withdrawn in such a way that former distributive 
functions and organizations dealing with resource distribution and decisions over allocation and 
allowing investments are abolished or the threshold of administrative (official) consent elevated. 
Thus, hierarchical lines of command are shortened and lines interlinking functions and 
organizations are also withdrawn. The network was and is cut-off through privatizations and 
close-downs when targets embraced by hierarchical and interlinking lines disappeared from the 
end of the lines. The network – both hierarchical, interlinking lines and feedbacks -- were 
streamlined for purposes of rationalization that weaken their density and accumulation declining 
the capacity for interest promotion. 
Emergence of the new economic sub-sphere (market) outside the net occurred as a result 
of allowing over-the plan production to be sold at market prices both in the industrial and 
agricultural spheres. The increase of the number of economic units and capital outside the net is 
allowed. Growing number of enterprises prior attached to the network now privatized. The results 
of the increase of the transfer (stripped) of convertible capacity (manpower, capital, organization, 
production) from the net outside of it. This drive is reinforced if chances for resource attraction 
through the network decline. The scope of the overlapping segment of the network and the 
emerging field widens through joint ventures or joint-stock companies with private majority 
share. 
Economic transformation is accompanied by a steady macroeconomic growth, 
overwhelmingly due to the emerging field outside the net through the continuous inflow of 
foreign capital and increasing domestic capital investments. Meanwhile, owing to the specifics of 
the distribution of extracting capacities in the network – cut-offs through privatization and close-
down are increasing from smaller to larger economic units and from lower to higher level 
administrative units. Since chances for bailing out larger loss-making SOEs narrow,  prospects of 
massive and concentrated lay-offs strengthen, revenue disparities at several dimensions widen, 
the party’s  mass and economic basis in SOEs, and joint companies is narrowing. However, party 
 legitimacy is kept due to macroeconomic growth, and redistribution of resources for the 
sustainment of the network. 
Thus, pattern characteristics not only determine the instruments and ways of operation, but 
also the sequence, speed and conditions of transformation. Consequently, pattern-characteristics are 
the structural reasons of the deviation of Chinese transformation route and the “incapacity” of the 
Hungarian pattern to choose Chinese way.  
Conclusions 
 
We have introduced a comparative institutional framework that puts the Hungarian and Chinese 
party-states on common systemic ground despite their huge individual disparities in size, in 
geopolitical location, economic structure, cultural and historical traditions.  Based on these 
general features we have also demonstrated the structural background of different operation and 
transformation of the two communist systems. Different patterns of power distribution explain 
the disparities in the sequence, speed and political conditions of economic transformation and 
economic conditions of political of transformation in the two countries. These characteristics 
explain why Hungarian „Goulash Communism” ended up in declining legitimacy of the party and 
political transformation first accompanied by economic crisis, under democratic regime while we 
find the specifics of the „Chinese style” in economic transformation first accompanied by 
macroeconomic growth under authoritarian regime keeping party legitimacy.  We may conclude 
that the Chinese deviation from the Hungarian reform example was first of all due to structural 
constraints of the Chinese pattern of power rather than an issue of strategic choice for economic 
transformation first. Similarly, structural constraints hindered the Hungarian economic policy to 
pursue Chinese style reforms. Reforms within the network or external to it are pattern-
conforming instruments of resource extraction and distribution. These pattern-conforming 
instruments escalate with external and internal adaptation pressures that lead to the specific 
sequence, speed and conditions of transformation. Room for manoeuvre is given within the 
structural constraints.    
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In this paper, I introduce a comparative institutional framework that places the Hungarian and 
Chinese party-states on common systemic ground despite their huge individual disparities in 
size, geopolitical location, economic structure, and cultural and historical traditions.  Based on 
these general features, I also demonstrate the structural background to the different 
functioning and transformation of the two communist systems. Different patterns of power 
distribution explain the disparities in the sequence, speed and political conditions for economic 
transformation, and the economic conditions for political of transformation in the two countries. 
These characteristics explain why Hungarian “Goulash Communism” ended up with the 
declining legitimacy of the party and political transformation, accompanied by economic crisis 
and the transition to democracy, while we find the specifics of the “Chinese style” in economic 
transformation accompanied by macroeconomic growth under an authoritarian regime, 
retaining party legitimacy. We may conclude that the Chinese deviation from the Hungarian 
reform example was due primarily to structural constraints of the Chinese pattern of power, 
rather than an issue of a strategic choice for economic transformation. Similarly, structural 
constraints hindered Hungarian economic policy in pursuing Chinese-style reforms. Reforms 
within the network or external to it are pattern-conforming instruments of resource extraction 
and distribution. These pattern-conforming instruments escalate with external and internal 
adaptation pressures that lead to the specific sequence, speed and conditions of transformation. 
Room for maneuver is given within the structural constraints. 
 
